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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Farm-expansion buyers have been a dominant force in the farmland 
market. In a recent survey by the Federal Land Bank of Omaha (1981) 
conducted from April 1980 to April 1981, it was found that 70 percent 
of the 4,000 land transactions polled in Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota 
and Wyoming were made by farm-expansion buyers. Another 15 percent of 
land purchases were by beginning farmers and 15 percent by farmland 
investors. The Federal Land Bank's survey results were consistent with 
survey results published in the USDA's "Farm Real Estate Market Develop­
ments" (1975, p. 23), which indicated that 68 percent of farmland purchases 
in the Cornbelt during 1971 were by farmers, and in 1975, 69 percent of 
purchases in the Cornbelt were by farmers. Although the sample area in 
these two surveys is different, both samples include the state of Iowa, 
and both samples indicate that farm-expansion buyers comprise the majority 
of buyers. 
This dominance of the farmland market by farm-expansion buyers 
implies that farm-expansion buyers are willing and able to outbid other 
buyers in the farmland market. Assuming all buyers or potential buyers 
in the farmland market are free from cash flow or other restraints, 
personal or institutional, this dominance suggests that farm-expansion 
buyers place a higher value on farmland than their competitors in the 
majority of farmland transactions. Or, assuming all buyers or potential 
buyers in the farmland market place an equal value on a parcel of land 
but are subject to restraints, the dominance of farm-expansion buyers 
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would imply that their bid prices are less affected by these restraints 
than are the bid prices of other potential buyers. 
This dominance of farm-expansion buyers in the farmland market 
raises questions concerning efficient allocation of resources and owner­
ship structure of farmland. As for efficiency, the question arises 
whether farmers in their competition for farmland ignored the opportunity 
cost of their own labor and other owned resources, thus allowing them 
to raise their bid for farmland. Ignoring such opportunity costs results 
in an inefficient allocation of resources. As for ownership structure, 
the question arises whether farmers in their competition for farmland 
drive the price of land up to a point where the price has created a 
barrier to new entrants. Such an entry barrier could lead to an increased 
concentration of farmland ownership. 
The focus of this thesis is not directly on the policy issues of 
efficiency and ownership structure. Instead, the objective of this 
thesis is to investigate the factors that allow farm-expansion buyers 
to dominate the farmland market successfully and the effect these factors 
have on land prices. More specifically, the objectives of this thesis are: 
1. review from the existing literature hypothesized explana­
tions for the dominance of farm-expansion buyers and the 
consequential effect on farmland prices; 
2. theoretically examine the validity of those hypothesized 
explanations; and 
3. empirically test the validity of those hypothesized 
explanations. 
In Chapter II, a number of the factors affecting land prices that 
have been discussed in the literature are reviewed with the focus on 
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those studies that included factors related to farm expansion. In 
Chapter III, the theoretical validity of those factors affecting farm­
land prices is evaluated. Empirical tests of those factors that allow 
farm-expansion buyers to dominate the farmland market are conducted 
in Chapters IV, V and VI. Chapter IV describes a micro-land-price data 
set used in this study. Chapter V discusses the empirical model used 
to test the hypothesized factors and the results obtained from this 
model. Chapter VI presents a summary of the results and the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II. RELATED LITERATURE 
Although this study focuses on the effect of farm expansion on land 
prices, a brief review of other studies that have focused on other 
important issues affecting land values is presented. Such a review is 
necessary to identify other variables that are important for the explana­
tion of land values. Failure to consider these factors may lead to 
errors that result from excluding variables. This section on other 
issues is followed by a review of land value studies that include the 
farm-expansion effect on land prices. 
Farmland Value Studies Not Addressing the 
Farm-Expansion Issue 
There have been a number of land valuation studies, but not all of 
the land value studies have examined the farm expansion issue. For 
example, Reinsel and Krenz (1972), Boxley and Gibson (1964), Hedrick 
(1962) and Boxley and Anderson (1973) have estimated the effects of 
government payments on farmland values. The effect of federal income 
taxes on land values was examined by Dean and Carter (1962) and Martin 
and Gatz (1968). Differences in productivity was the main factor 
explaining land value differences in a study by Blase and Hesemann (1973) 
and Hammill (1969). Hammill also found distance from urban center as a 
major factor explaining land values. The effect of roads and location 
were important variables in studies by Edwards et al. (1964) and Ahmad 
and Parcher (1964). Van Hove (1978) analyzed the effect of installment 
land contracts on selling prices of Iowa farmland. The influence of tech­
nological change on land values was tested by Herdt and Cochrane (1966) . 
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The above list of studies Is by no means exhaustive, but those 
studies Identify a number of Important factors affecting land values. 
Their impact will be considered later in the empirical testing of 
expansion-related factors affecting land values. 
Land Value Studies Addressing the 
Farm-Expansion Issue 
Studies that have addressed the farm-expansion issue have been 
both theoretical and empirical in nature. A study by Harris and Nehring 
(1976) presented a theoretical farm bid model with simulated results. 
Their work provided a useful conceptual model to consider the effects 
of increasing returns to land over time, marginal Income tax rates, 
increased returns due to economies of scale, a farmer's degree of risk 
aversion toward the variability in income from the land and the effect 
of wealth on the degree of risk aversion. Although conceptually appealing, 
the Harris and Nehring model is difficult to test empirically, because it 
requires the knowledge of an Individual's utility function. 
The farm-expansion hypothesis has been tested in a number of 
empirical studies. Heady and Tweeten (1963), Tweeten and Nelson (1966), 
Reynolds and Tlmmons (1969) and Kuhlman (1978) included the farm-expansion 
hypothesis as an explanation of variation in aggregated U.S. farmland 
price data. Other studies by Klinefelter (1973), White, Musser and 
Sheffield (1977), Walker (1976) and Montgomery and Tarbet (1968) included 
the farm-expansion hypothesis in an analysis of state or county land 
prices. The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of each of 
the farm-expansion studies listed above plus a brief summary of a study 
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by Pope, Kramer, Green and Gardner (1979) that has tested three of the 
above models for structural changes. 
Heady and Tweeten (1963) developed a single-equation-price-adjustment 
model to explain land value trends in the United States from 1910 to 1959. 
The factors influencing land values in their model were: farm expansion, 
residual return to land, capitalization rate and technological change. 
Heady and Tweeten hypothesized and tested a number of other factors which 
were not included in the final model due to collinearity problems. The 
variable used to capture the farm-enlargement effect was average acres 
of cropland used for crops per farm. The estimated coefficient was signif­
icant and had the hypothesized sign. Long-run and short-run elasticities 
of land prices with respect to average cropland acres per farm were 0.6 
and 2.7, respectively. With these results. Heady and Tweeten concluded 
that farm expansion has had a major effect on farmland price increases. 
Tweeten and Nelson (1966)^  estimated the variation in a deflated 
United States land price index for the time period from 1923 to 1963 
using a single-equation price-adjustment model and a five-equation-
recursive model. The single-equation model had land prices as a function 
of: number of acres in farms, number of transfers of farm real estate, 
number of farms, net farm income, return on nonfarm Investment and the 
previous year's land price. For the five-equation-recursive model, the 
actual variables — number of acres in farms, number of transfers of farm 
T^weeten and Martin (1966) essentially present the Tweeten and 
Nelson model in their article, but concentrate their discussion on the 
methodology of predicting land prices. 
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real estate and farm numbers — were each treated as a dependent variable 
in separate models, which were estimated by a number of predetermined 
variables. An additional equation estimated cropland used for crops, 
a variable in the number-of-acres-in-farms equation. The predicted 
values for these variables were then used in the land-price equation. 
The variables selected by Tweeten and Nelson (1966) were used to 
capture a number of hypothesized factors of which the farm-consolidation, 
farm-expansion hypothesis, was one. The number-of-farms variable was 
used to capture the farm-consolidation hypothesis. Besides capturing 
the farm-consolidation effect, the number-of-farms variable indirectly 
captured a number of other effects. For example, in the recursive model, 
the variable for farm numbers was estimated as a function of machinery 
stock, a ratio of nonfarm workers' earnings to farm workers' earnings 
adjusted by the nonfarm unemployment rate, capital gains and farm numbers 
from the previous year. These variables, machinery stock, ratio of wage 
earnings and capital gains, capture the effects of excess machinery 
capacity, excess labor and past changes in land values on land prices. 
The estimated coefficients had the hypothesized signs, but the farm-
numbers coefficient was borderline for statistical significance. Tweeten 
and Nelson concluded that farm consolidation and government programs 
restricting land were the major contributors to land price increases 
from 1950 to 1963. 
Reynolds and Timmons (1969) developed a two-equation recursive 
model to identify the factors affecting average United States farmland 
values for the years 1933 to 1965. Reynolds and Timmons also used their 
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recursive model in a cross-sectional analysis using average state land 
values for the 48 states for the years 1940, 1950, 1954 and 1959. The 
land-price equation was a function of predicted voluntary farm transfers, 
government payments, conservation payments, capital gains, change in 
average farm size (the farm-expansion variable), one over the rate of 
return on common stocks, and net farm income. The predicted voluntary 
farm transfers variable was also a function of change in average farm 
size, debt-to-equity ratio, ratio of farm earnings to nonfarm earnings 
(an opportunity cost of labor variable), capital gains and man-hours of 
labor per acre (a technological change variable). The farm-expansion 
variable had a direct effect on land values, because it was an explanatory 
variable in the land-price equation, and it also had an indirect effect 
on land values, because it was an explanatory variable in the voluntary-
farm-transfer equation. Voluntary-farm-transfers was also an explana­
tory variable in the land-price equation. The estimated coefficient for 
the change in the average-farm-size variable had the expected sign and 
was statistically significant in the time-series model, but the estimated 
average-farm-size coefficient in the cross-section model had the opposite 
sign and was statistically insignificant. 
Kuhlman (1978) used a single-equation model to test factors affecting 
average U.S. farmland values from 1940 to 1977. Land values were 
hypothesized to be a function of inflationary expectations, technological 
advance, government programs, real estate taxes, population, urbaniza­
tion, ease of financing, alternative employment, farm consolidation, net 
income from farming and capital gains. Due to problems of collinearities. 
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a number of variables were dropped from the final estimated equation. 
The average-size-farm variable representing the farm-expansion hypothesis 
was dropped, because the estimated coefficient was statistically insignif­
icant and did not have the hypothesized sign. Kuhlman reported a 0.999 
correlation coefficient between the average-farm-size variable and the 
population variable, and he also reported correlation coefficients of 
0.9 and greater between average farm size and four other variables. 
Klinefelter (1973) used a single-equation model to estimate changes 
in average Illinois state land values for the time period 1951 to 1970. 
He tested the influence of inflation, net returns to farmland, expected 
capital gains, farm enlargement, technology, number of farmland transfers 
and government payments. Due to multicollinearity problems, Klinefelter 
included only four variables in his final model: net return, average 
farm size, number of voluntary transfers and expected capital gains. 
Klinefelter referred to the farmr-enlargement hypothesis by Tweeten (1964), 
as did Reynolds and Timmons (1969). Klinefelter also referred to a 
hypothesis by Tolley (1970) that the shift in cost curves for farms is 
due to larger, high-level management farms replacing smaller, low-level 
management farms. Average farm size was the variable used to capture 
the farm-enlargement effect. The estimated coefficient for average farm 
size was significant and had the correct sign. Due to the collinearity 
problem, average size of farm was also capturing the effect of tech­
nological change. Klinefelter reported a 0.98 correlation coefficient 
between average farm size and a moving average of corn yields, the 
technological change variable. 
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White, Musser and Sheffield (1977) applied Tweeten and Nelson's 
model to examine average state land values in Georgia for the years 
1960 to 1974. They hypothesized that the farm-expansion effect on land 
values was declining due to the outward migration from farming and the 
decentralization of nonfarm employment into rural areas. Such de­
centralization provides employment for part-time farmers as well as 
Increased demand for small hobby farms or small farms to supplement 
workers' Income in the nonfarm rural industries. Their results supported 
their hypothesis. The farm-numbers variable was not statistically 
significant. 
Walker (1976) developed a cross-section analysis of average Iowa 
county land values. Land values were considered a function of net income 
per acre, the county's five-year average corn yield, percent of land in 
row crops in a county, ratio of cattle marketed in a county compared to 
cattle marketed in the state, geometric mean of land value appreciation, 
population per square mile in a county and average farm size in a county. 
The coefficient estimated for the average farm size, the farm-
expansion variable, was statistically Insignificant and did not have the 
hypothesized sign. Therefore, the average-farm-size variable was dropped 
from the model. 
Montgomery and Tarbet (1968), through a descriptive analysis of two 
samples of wheat-pea farmers in the Northwest, identified several 
characteristics of potential land buyers. One sample of actual farm 
sales provided information with which Montgomery and Tarbet derived a 
set of criteria to Identify potential land buyers. The criteria were 
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ability to make a 30 percent downpayment, and ability to pay back the 
loan in 20 years on the average size farm tract sold during 1963. From 
a second survey containing income and wealth data on 35 farmers, only 
11 farmers were considered potential farm buyers by the above criteria. 
These potential farm buyers farmed a larger acreage, had a greater 
return to land, had greater wealth and carried more debt than the non-
potential farm-buyer group. Although the potential farm-buyer group 
was larger in size than the nonpotential buyers, Montgomery and Tarbet 
concluded that farm expansion was not a major factor, since 40 percent 
of the land sales in their first sample involved farmers purchasing 
land they already farmed through renting. 
A study by Pope, Kramer, Green and Gardner (1979) reestimated 
models used by Tweeten and Nelson, and Reynolds and Timmons by using 
more recent data, and they modified Klinefelter's model to use U.S. 
data instead of Illinois data. The modified Klinefelter model resulted 
in average farm size, having a negative sign for the years 1913 to 1972 
and a positive sign for the years 1946 to 1972. A number of other 
variables in the Klinefelter model resulted in coefficients with in­
correct signs, yet the total model explained 99 percent of the varia­
tion in land prices. Reynolds and Timmons' estimated coefficient for 
the change-in-average-farm-size variable had the incorrect sign and 
was insignificant. Tweeten and Nelson's farm-number variable had a 
smaller coefficient and was statistically significant in the single-
equation model but not in the recursive model. 
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The above studies can be categorized into several groups. The 
studies by Heady and Tweeten, Tweeten and Nelson, and the time series 
study by Reynolds and Timmons compose one group of studies that used 
aggregate U.S. data and had positive results that supported the farm-
expansion hypothesis. The studies by Kuhlman and Pope et al. are a 
second group of studies that used aggregate U.S. data and had results 
that did not support the farm-expansion hypothesis. In Kuhlman's case, 
the negative results were due to multicollinearity problems, and in 
Pope's case, the negative results indicate possible structural changes 
in the land market or the possible Inadequacies of the earlier models. 
Studies by White et al. and Klinefelter differ from the above two groups 
in that they used individual state land prices rather than the U.S. 
farm real estate data. The results of White's study support the 
possibility of structural change in the land market in which the 
importance of the farm-expansion effect on land prices was declining. 
Klinefelter's results indicated the recurring problem of collinearities. 
The cross-section studies by Walker, and Reynolds and Timmons form a 
fourth group which obtained unsatisfactory results in estimating the 
farm-expansion variable. The final study by Montgomery and Tarbet 
differed from the above studies both in empirical method and in focus. 
Montgomery and Tarbet's study was descriptive consisting of sample 
comparisons as compared to the econometric models used in the other 
farm-expansion studies. As for focus, their study concentrated strictly 
on the demand side, the buyer's side, as compared to the other studies, 
which included supply as well as demand factors for land. 
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Empirical Problems in Land-Price Studies 
Addressing the Farm^ Expansion Effect 
The summary of past empirical studies has revealed two empirical 
problems, multlcollinearity and specification errors. Multlcollinearity 
problems frequently occur in studies that use time-series data due to 
the common time trend in many of the variables. Multlcollinearity 
results in a loss of precision for the estimated coefficients due to 
the large variance associated with the estimated coefficients. Reinsel 
(1973) Illustrated that 99 percent of the variation in the U.S. farm 
real estate Index could be explained by the money supply and population. 
Reinsel*s study questioned whether other studies using elaborate models 
could draw conclusive results due to the high correlation that exists 
among fundamental economic factors. Heady and Tweeten, Tweeten and 
Nelson, and Kuhlman all referred to high correlation problems among 
explanatory variables. Tweeten and Nelson noted that the exact contribu­
tion of farm consolidation and government programs, the variables that 
explained the largest percentage of variation, cannot be pinpointed. 
Tweeten and Nelson (1966, p. 48) went on to say: 
Because more than one set of variables predicts almost 
equally well and can be justified from an economic 
standpoint, the process of selecting the appropriate 
model is somewhat subjective. 
The use of averages such as average farm size and change in average 
farm size leads to possible specification errors. Specification errors 
result in biased coefficients and a larger variance associated with the 
estimated coefficients. Scofleld (1964) has argued that farmers 
operating larger-than-average farms are the primary bidders for farmland. 
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If Scofield's assertion is correct, use of average farm size as a proxy 
variable to capture the effect of economies of size on land prices may 
result in biased coefficients and larger standard errors unless the 
movement in average-size farms Is highly correlated with the movement 
in efficient-size farms. High correlation with the actual variable is 
a desirable quality for a proxy variable. In cross-section studies, 
as illustrated by the studies by Walker, and Reynolds and Tlmmons, the 
use of average farm size or change in average farm size proved to be 
unsatisfactory, because the models did not account for differences among 
types of farms. For example, an efficient-size dryland farm may be 
larger and have a lower per acre value than the efficient-size irrigated 
farm. Unless such differences in farm types are accounted for In the 
model, the unsatisfactory results obtained by using average farm size 
to explain aggregate land values are not surprising. Reynolds and 
Tlmmons referred to such a case in that the Mountain and Southern 
Plains states had larger Increases in average farm size and lower land 
values compared to more intensively farmed areas with higher land values. 
Delineating the Farm-Expansion Hypothesis 
In the existing literature on the effect of farm expansion on land 
prices, a number of motivating factors for farm expansion have been 
discussed, but either have not been tested or tested but not as separate 
hypotheses. Based on a review of prior work, it Is possible to delineate 
the general farm expansion hypothesis into five separate hypotheses; 
economies of size, excess machinery, wealth, excess labor, and quality 
of management. The following section provides a brief sketch of the 
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conceptual arguments presented In the literature for each hypothesis 
and describes how each hypothesis has been empirically tested. 
Economies of size 
Economies of size was the main argument for the farm-expansion effect 
on land prices given in the previously summarized studies. The illustra­
tion by Tweeten (1964) was the most frequently referenced argument for 
economies of size. Tweeten's illustration is an adjustment argument 
where a farmer has previously acquired new labor-saving machinery and 
then finds himself with excess machinery capacity. By acquiring addi­
tional acreage, the farmer is able to reduce his average costs per acre, 
which implies a greater residual return per acre with the acquisition 
of additional land. Although Tweeten's example introduced the term 
excess machinery capacity, this is not essential to the argument. The 
essential point that distinguishes this argument as an economies of 
size hypothesis is the reduction in average cost that occurs with 
increases in farm size. 
To empirically test for size economies, a measure of farm size 
would be desirable. In the previously summarized studies farm numbers, 
average farm size and change in average farm size were used. Because 
of the aggregate land price data set, these variables were probably the 
best available although average size may not capture the true size effect 
on land prices. Actual sales data for the farm unit with Information on 
farm size after the sale would more likely capture the size effect on 
land prices. 
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The empirical farm expansion studies previously summarized have 
not considered the case of a flat long-run average cost curve. A study 
by Fulton (1975, p. 105) indicated that most size economies in Iowa can 
be obtained by 600 acres. If the long-run average cost curve is 
relatively flat, one would conclude that the size of farms beyond a 
certain minimum acreage would have little impact on farmland prices. 
Over time, however, this certain minimum acreage point may increase due 
to technological change, which has been the historical case. In a 
cross-section study of land price data, or a shorter time-series study 
of land prices in which technology is fixed, the effect of economies-of-
size on land prices would be smaller than in a longer time-series study 
which captures the technological effects. 
Excess machinery 
Another motive for the farmr-expansion effect on land prices is the 
excess-machinery hypothesis. Heady and Tweeten (1963, p. 407) 
presented another economies-of-size illustration that differs slightly 
from the above Tweeten (1964) illustration. It is from the Heady 
and Tweeten illustration that this study draws its excess machinery 
hypothesis. The illustration is as follows: 
A farmer owning 160 acres with receipts above variable 
costs of $50 per acre and with nonland fixed costs of 
$30 per acre earns $20 as the imputed return to land. 
Based on a discount rate of 10 per cent, he could pay 
$20/.10 = $200 per acre for the "home" acreage. But 
suppose an additional 40 acres is available nearby and 
he can farm it with existing machinery and other "fixed," 
discrete inputs. Again, the receipts above operating 
costs are $50 per acre, and since marginal machinery 
and other overhead costs are near zero, the return to 
land is nearly $50. Discounting at the same rate as 
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before, the farmer may pay up to $50/.10 = $500 per 
acre for the additional 40 acres. It Is clear that 
In circumstances where available equipment can be 
used profitably on more acres, farmers Intending to 
expand acreage can outbid those Intending to farm only 
the purchased land. 
Although very similar to the economles-of-slze example used by 
Tweeten, and Tweeten and Nelson, this earlier Illustration by Heady 
and Tweeten differs In that fixed costs are treated as zero In 
calculating the residual return to land, where In the later Illustra­
tion by Tweeten, and Tweeten and Nelson, fixed costs per acre are 
reduced by spreading the fixed costs over the total acreage. 
This earlier example by Heady and Tweeten ignores some Issues. If 
the farmer In fact pays $500 per acre, and If a competitive market for 
farmland exists which Implies a single price for all land, then this 
$500 per acre price would also be the opportunity value for the "home" 
acreage. The "home" acreage, after the purchase of the additional 40 
acres, Is still receiving a residual return of 20 dollars per acre, a 
4 percent return on the value of the land, which is less than the 
farmer's 10 percent capitalization rate. The farmer is unable to cover 
the cost of land ownership. This observation leads to the conclusion 
that the capitalization of the $50 return as a perpetual return to land 
is in error. In the short run, a farmer could afford to pay $50 an 
acre in rent for the additional 40 acres. In the long run, as the farmer 
replaces machinery, all costs become variable and a profit-maximizing 
farmer would calculate the residual to land after all costs have been 
considered. The rational farmer would only capitalize the short-run 
return over the life of his present machinery complement, but not as a 
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perpetual return. It may well be that farmers in competition for farm­
land lose sight of the long-run perspective and capitalize the short-run 
return to land as a perpetual income stream. For this study, the 
excess machinery hypothesis refers to the capitalization in the short 
run of those increased returns to land that result from excess machinery 
capacity. 
In Tweeten and Nelson's study, excess machinery capacity had an 
indirect effect on land prices. Tweeten and Nelson's excess machinery 
capacity represented unrealized or potential size economies. The 
aggregate stock of machinery was used by Tweeten and Nelson to explain 
farm numbers, the farm-size variable. Increases in the aggregate stock 
of machinery over time capture the substitution of machinery for labor 
but do not necessarily imply excess machinery capacity in the hands of 
those bidding for farmland. A measure of machinery capacity per acre 
such as horsepower per acre before the acquisition of farmland would 
better capture the effect of the excess-machinery hypothesis. 
Wealth 
The wealth hypothesis refers to a land buyer who uses profits or 
returns to owned land or past accumulated profits, wealth, to acquire 
additional land. There are two arguments for this hypothesis. The 
first argument is that profits to owned land and wealth provide the 
land buyer with funds to overcome possible cash flow restraints that 
would limit his bid for land. Tweeten and Nelson's discussion (1966, 
p. 18) of the farm enlargement hypothesis noted that farmers who already 
have efficient-size farms are making profits that may be used for 
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additional farmland investment and that owned land provides a useful 
credit base. The second reason is that the farmland buyer uses the 
profits from owned land or accumulated wealth to make a higher bid for 
land to insure the acquisition of land for personal reasons, such as status 
or pride of ownership. Raup (1978, p. 306) makes the following argument: 
With full economic rationality, they (family farmers) 
can include in their calculation of rate of return a 
variety of nonmonetary rewards including pride of 
ownership, continuity of family, freedom of choice 
of work time and place and ability to identify effort 
with reward. 
The wealth hypothesis has not been empirically tested. Although 
Tweeten and Nelson mentioned the credit value of owned land, they did 
not specify a specific variable to capture the wealth effect other than 
their general farm-enlargement variable. 
Excess labor 
Tweeten and Nelson (1966, p. 19) made the following excess labor 
argument ; 
Accumulation of excess labor and consequent competi­
tion for available farming units forces those who 
remain to pay more and more for control of land and 
therefore to accept lower residual returns to their 
labor and management. 
The ratio of factory workers' earnings to farm workers' earnings was 
used by Tweeten and Nelson to capture indirectly the excess-labor 
effect on land values through the effect of the earnings-ratio variable 
on farm numbers. It could be argued that this earnings ratio actually 
is a land-supply variable explaining the outmigration of farmers and, 
hence, smaller farm numbers, rather than a land-demand variable 
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explaining farmers accepting lower returns to labor and management. 
In fact, Reynolds and Timmons used a similar earnings ratio to explain 
changes in farm transfers. 
Quality of management 
The final hypothesis is the quality of management hypothesis. 
High quality management results in a higher residual return to land due 
to above average production and marketing skills of the farmer. 
The quality of management hypothesis has been indirectly cited in 
the literature. Scofield (1964) hypothesized that a few large, wealthy 
and better-than-average farmers are the primary bidders for farmland. 
Montgomery and Tarbet's study supports Scofield's hypothesis, but their 
study does not specifically conclude whether the higher returns are due 
to management or size. 
Klinefelter, in his discussion of the farm-enlargement hypothesis, 
referred to a hypothesis by Tolley (1970) that favorable cost-curve 
shifts have been due to the substitution of fewer, high-level management 
farms for low-level management farms. Klinefelter did not test for the 
quality-of-management effect, however, other than through the farm-
enlargement variable. 
The purpose of this study is to test the above five hypotheses 
related to farm expansion by using data on actual land-price sales. 
Hopefully, from micro land-price data, more specific inferences about 
the effect of those hypotheses on Iowa farmland prices can be made as 
compared to the general conclusions drawn from research using aggregate 
land-price data. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL VALIDITY OF HYPOTHESES 
A discussion of valuation models Is In order before discussing the 
five hypotheses affecting farmland prices. Following the discussion of 
valuation models, the theoretical validity of each hypothesis and the 
effect of that hypothesis otv the land valuation model is presented. 
Also, a discussion of why each hypothesis is applicable to farm-expansion 
buyers more than to other classes of farmland buyers is included. 
Valuation 
The value placed on farmland by a farmland buyer reflects the 
present value of an anticipated Income stream generated from the land. 
The valuation of this income stream expressed as a general equation is 
R^  - C. R» - C„ R - C 
'  • • • •  '  ^  '  
where Vq represents the present value of an acre of farmland, R^  ^is the 
total revenue per acre received at the end of the first year, C^  ^is the 
total cost per acre for the first year, k is the capitalization rate and 
n is the number of years. If net returns for land are expected to grow 
over time from the present level of net returns (RQ - CQ) at a growth 
rate of g, Equation 3.1 may be written as 
(R - C ) (R - C )(l+g) (R - C.)(l+g)2 
(R^  - C^ )(l+g)""^  
• • • • ^ <n * 
(1+k) 
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If farmland is assumed to have an infinite life (n-»») and the growth 
rate is less than the capitalization rate (g<k), Equation 3.2 simplifies 
to 
R - C 
If returns are expected to be constant over time (g = 0), Equation 3.3 
reduces to 
(3.4) Vq = *0 t ^ 0 , 
which is the standard capitalization formula for a perpetual income stream 
with constant returns. 
Before concluding the discussion on valuation, a remark about the 
effect of marginal income tax rates on valuation is in order. The 
effect of marginal Income tax rates on valuation has been addressed by 
Adams (1977), Baker (1981) and Jeremias (1981). From their work, it is 
evident that the effect of marginal tax rates on valuation depends on 
whether growth or constant returns are assumed. For example, valuation 
Equation 3.4 adjusted for taxes is 
... 
where t is the marginal tax rate. In this case, the tax rate has no 
effect on valuation. Now adjusting valuation Equation 3.3, the case of 
real growth over time, for taxes, the equation becomes 
(R. - C )(1-t) 
0^ k(l-t)-g • 
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Because 
valuation Increases with increases in the marginal tax rate. Thus, 
marginal tax rates have either a positive effect or no effect at all 
on valuation. Because of the indeterminant effect of tax rates on 
valuation, tax rates were ignored from further discussion. 
Economies of Size 
In the short run, a firm maximizes profit by adjusting the firm's 
mix of variable inputs to equate marginal cost to output price. In the 
long run, a firm adjusts the mix of all inputs to achieve minimum cost 
per unit of output. If economies of size exist, a firm is able to lower 
its cost per unit of output by expanding output. In agriculture, such 
economies of size occur over time with the introduction of larger 
machinery complements that allow an individual to farm more acres at 
a lover cost. Adjustment to a larger size farm is not an instantaneous 
process. Early adopters of a larger size machinery complement acquire 
additional land at prevailing prices and receive economic profits due 
to a decrease in per unit costs resulting from economies of size. As 
more and more farmers expand to larger-size farm units, those economic 
profits are bid into the price of land. 
Figure 3.1 Illustrates the above discussion. The cost curves in 
Figure 3.1 include all costs except land charges. Land is assumed to 
be a complement to other inputs and output. To use more Inputs requires 
more land, and to produce a greater output, more land Is required. 
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Price 
SAC. 
SAC 
Q Q Quantity of output 
Lg Acres of land 
Figure 3.1. Illustration of economies of size 
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For simplicity, assume there exists only one available line of machinery 
represented by the short-run average cost curve SAC^^, the price of output 
is and the present level of production is Q^, which is equivalent to 
using acres of land. The area a b represents the economic 
rent or return to acres of land. If the market rent for an acre of 
land is P^ a b Pg 4- L^, then at acres, price would equal marginal 
costs and income would be maximized. The maximum rent a farmer would 
pay for acres would be the area P^ a b Pg. 
Now, assume another line of farm implements comes on the market 
represented by the short-run average cost curve SAC^. Assuming that 
farmers adopting this new machinery maintain present price expectations 
and assuming that the supply of land is fixed (which Is a reasonable 
assumption, considering the local market In which a farm-expansion buyer 
operates), and also assuming the supply of other farm inputs is perfectly 
elastic, then the per-acre rental value is bid up as farmers compete 
for land in order to gain economies of size available with the new line 
of farm implements. Figure 3.1 illustrates that point. Tlie maximum 
rent for acres is P^ c d Pg ? Lg, which is greater than the maximum 
rent with acres. Thus, economies of size result in larger rents 
to land. 
In reality, instead of only two short-run-average-cost curves, 
there are an Infinite number of short-run-average-cost curves. 
Empirically, the question is whether the long-run-average-cost curve, 
the envelope curve which encompasses all short-run-average-cost curves, 
is a U-shaped curve with cost minimized at a single level of output or 
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whether the long-run-average-cost curve is an L-shaped curve with costs 
minimized over a wide output level. The empirical study by Fulton 
(1975, p. 105) referred to in Chapter II indicated that most economies 
of size can be obtained by 600 acres. Thus, the effect of economies 
of size on land rents would be minimal beyond 600 acres. 
By relating the above discussion to our valuation models presented 
earlier, it is evident that economies of size result in a lower cost 
component C^, and thus a higher net return which in turn implies a 
higher maximum value or a higher maximum bid price on land. Increasing 
farm size has a positive effect on value. The effect of increasing 
farm size on value diminishes until average nonland costs are minimized, 
at which point the value of land would be at its maximum. 
The effect of economies of size on bid prices is not limited to 
farm-expansion buyers. An entering farmer purchasing an optimal size 
farm, 600 acres or more, would bid the same price per acre as would a 
farm-expansion buyer purchasing an add-on-unit to achieve the same optimal 
size farm. An outside investor could buy land and in turn rent it to a 
farmer who would then have an optimal size farm. Although the effect of 
economies of size is not limited to farm-expansion buyers, the opportunity 
for an entering farmer to obtain an optimum size farm is limited. For a 
family-farm-type entrant, capital may be a limiting factor. For other 
entrants with adequate capital, the limitation may occur due to a lack 
of efficient-size farm units for sale. Most land sales involve acreages 
of less than efficient size units. In the data set used in this study, 
160 of the 186 land transactions consisted of transactions of less than 
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200 acres. Although outside Investors could still acquire the smaller 
units and rent them to established farmers who have obtained size 
economies, the outside Investor may be deterred because of the un­
certainty of obtaining a good tenant. The point to be made from this 
discussion Is that a farm-expansion buyer Is less likely to face 
restrictions In achieving a farm of efficient size. 
Excess Machinery 
The excess machinery phenomenon Is a short-run constrained maximiza­
tion problem. It Is assumed that the farm firm possesses a machinery 
complement capable of obtaining size economies, but the farm firm does 
not have the land complement to achieve these economies. It Is also 
assumed that there Is no market to hire out excess machinery capacity. 
The question for the farm firm Is how much rent can the firm afford to 
pay for an additional acre or tract of land for the current production 
period. The problem Is formulated as 
(3.8) 7r= PQ - C(Q) - FC + (LQ - L(Q)) + (MQ - M[L(Q)]) , 
where; 
If = profits, 
P = price per unit of output, 
Q = unit of output, 
C(Q) = short-run cost function, 
FC = fixed costs, 
LQ = current land base, 
L(Q) = land used which is a function of output. 
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MQ = machinery capacity with current machinery complement, 
M[L(Q)] ) = machinery capacity used as a function of land used, 
= lagrangian multiplier or shadow price on land, and 
^2 = lagrangian multiplier or shadow price on machinery capacity. 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for profit maximization are; 
q i  0  ,  
If • " • " • 
^ ^ - L o - u q ) i o  , 
0 , 
Ix  ^ • ^1 = 0 ' 
' «0 - "&«)] iO . 
^210 s and 
- *2 - 0 -
Solving forgiven the assumptions of a binding land restraint, 
LQ - L(Q) = 0, and excess machinery capacity, MQ>m[l(Q)] , which 
implies = 0» gives the following result: 
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^ àL - IQ II ' 
= VMP - MFC. 
Thus, the maximum a farmer would pay in rent for an additional acre 
of land in the short run is the value marginal product (VMP) less the 
marginal factor costs (MFC) of farming another unit of land, which is 
equivalent to gross revenue less operating expenses for the additional 
unit of land. In the long run, as the farmer replaces his machinery 
complement, the cost of the new equipment has to be allocated over the 
total acreage farmed. Determination of rent for the long run is gross 
revenue less operating and fixed costs. The maximum rent a farmer with 
excess machinery capacity would pay in the short run is greater than 
what the farmer would pay over a long period of time. It should be 
noted if the assumption of no alternative market to hire out excess 
machinery is relaxed, then rent in the short run equals rent in the 
long run. 
Relating the above discussion to valuation Equation 3.1, it is 
evident that the cost component C^ is lower at least for the short run. 
This implies that the farm-expansion buyer with excess machinery capacity 
would be capitalizing higher net returns in the earlier years than would 
an entering farmer or an outside farmland Investor or a farm-expansion 
buyer without excess machinery capacity. Excess machinery capacity 
is then hypothesized to have a positive effect on land values. 
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Wealth 
Two hypotheses for the wealth effect on farmland prices were out­
lined in Chapter II. Those two hypotheses were the Tweeten and Nelson 
(1966) hypothesis, that wealth in terms of owned farmland provides a 
useful credit base for further expansion, and the Raup (1978) hypothesis, 
that farmers receive nonmonetary rewards or utility from land ownership. 
Although those nonmonetary rewards are not directly related to wealth, 
the ability to add those returns to farmland bids is limited by the 
amount of wealth. In other words, the enjoyment of the nonmonetary 
rewards of land ownership requires a certain amount of wealth. 
To illustrate the effect of wealth on credit and consequently on 
the bid price, consider the following formulation: 
(3.11) ir= PQ(L + L ) - C(L + L ) + X(K(w) - SL ) , 
op op p 
where: f = profits, 
P = price of output, 
Q(L) = quantity of output as a function of land, 
C(L) = total cost as a function of land, 
= acres of owned land, 
Lp = acres of purchased land, 
K(w) = amount of credit available for purchasing land as a 
function of current wealth, 
R = price of land, and 
X = lagrangian multiplier or shadow price on credit restraint. 
Maximizing profits and solving for A assuming credit is limiting 
(K(w) - KLp = 0), gives the following result: 
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(3.12) X = (P-| - -^)/R>0. 
If X is greater than the buyer's capitalization rate, k, then the maximum 
value placed on the last acre purchased, - ^ )/k, is greater than 
the price of land. If the credit restraint is relaxed by an increase in 
wealth, then the buyer could either buy more land, or if the land avail­
able for purchase is limited, the buyer could place a higher bid on the 
land for sale. 
To illustrate Raup's hypothesis where utility is obtained from 
land, consider the following formulation: 
(3.13) U = U(C,L) + (R(L) - P^C - rL), 
where; U = utility, 
C = consumption goods, 
L = land, 
R(L) = net revenue as a function of land, 
= price of consumption goods, 
r = rent, and 
« = lagrangian multiplier. 
The utility maximization condition is : 
Assuming nonsaturation of consumption (^ >0 and ^  >0) , then rent is 
greater than the returns from the last unit of land (r >^). The 
revenue from that last acre is not sufficient to pay the rent. 
The utility maximizer will have to pay for this difference, which 
represents the value of nonmonetary returns from land, from his wealth 
or earnings from his wealth. 
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The wealth hypothesis again is not strictly restricted to farm-
expansion buyers, but the likelihood of a farm-expansion buyer with his 
own land base facing a credit restriction would be less than that for an 
entering farmer. The outside investor may not have credit restrictions 
on his farmland bid but is more likely to be investing in land for 
strictly profit motives and not for the utility gained from farmland 
ownership and the farm lifestyle. 
Excess Labor 
In order to calculate a net return for an additional land parcel, 
labor costs associated with the output from that parcel must be deter­
mined. In the case where labor is hired, the labor cost is simply the 
wage rate times the amount of labor. In the case of excess-owner-
operator-labor, where the owner operator has sufficient labor to farm 
an additional unit of land, the labor cost is the operator's opportunity 
cost of labor times the amount of labor. The opportunity cost assigned 
to labor varies from the current market wage rate to zero depending on 
each operator's perception or his opportunity cost. An operator who 
uses a major portion of his available labor in his current farm opera­
tion and has excess labor to farm an additional unit, but who finds any 
alternative off-farm employment opportunities to be nil, would consider 
the opportunity cost of his excess labor to be zero. This excess labor 
argument is equivalent to the excess machinery argument illustrated in 
Equation 3.8, but in this case the machinery capacity restraint is 
replaced by a labor restraint. Other operators who have alternative 
off-farm employment which pays at a wage rate equivalent to farm labor 
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may still value their own labor at a lower value because of uncertainty 
about the availability of off-farm employment. Owning a farm to fully 
utilize the operator's labor provides a certain employment security 
which off-farm employment does not. Other operators may simply find 
the alternative employment wage to be less than the farm wage. 
Another case which gives rise to excess labor is the case of a son 
entering the farm business. In this case, because of the kinship 
relationship, both father and son value their labor at less than their 
true opportunity cost. The father accepts a lower return in order to 
Insure an adequate land base to employ the son's labor. The son accepts 
a lower return for his labor in exchange for long-range security. He 
stands to inherit the farm business at some time in the future. 
Thus, the effect of excess labor in terms of an individual operator 
or the father-son partnership is to lower the cost component in the 
valuation model, because the operators accept a lower return for their 
labor. The reduced costs imply a higher value placed on land. 
Again, the argument can be made that the excess labor hypothesis 
does not exclusively apply to farm-expansion buyers. Outside investors 
could buy land and rent it to farmers having excess labor with no 
alternative employment opportunities. Â counter argument is that a 
farmer with excess labor would require a higher wage if renting because 
of uncertainty about retaining the lease. 
Quality of Management 
High-quality management results in higher net returns to land. In 
terms of our valuation model, quality of management affects the returns 
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and/or cost components of the model. High-quality management results 
In higher yields and higher prices, as well as lower costs due to the 
production and marketing skills of the farmer. Thus, high-quality 
management has a positive effect on valuation. 
Those higher returns to land due to management skills are actually 
a quasi-rent to management. A quasi-rent for a farmer's management is 
the value of management that exceeds the opportunity cost of a farmer's 
management. A common illustration of a quasi-rent for one's Individual 
skill is a professional athlete who earns a million dollars a year but 
has an opportunity cost for his labor of only twenty-thousand dollars a 
year. The amount in excess of this opportunity labor cost is a quasi-
rent for the athlete's skill. The farmer, unlike the athlete, does not 
have a market that bids for his management skills. Instead, the farmer 
must employ himself and acquire a land base In order to realize a 
reward for his management in excess of his off-farm opportunity cost 
of labor and management. If there are a number of farmers with high-
quality management skills competing for additional acreage, the quasi-
rents are bid into the price of land. The portion of quasi-rent bid 
into the price of land depends on the degree of competition. The 
greater the competition, the greater is the proportion of quasi-rents 
bid into the price of land up to the point where the quasi-rent is 
exhausted and a farmer would receive only a value equivalent to his 
opportunity cost for management. 
High-quality management is a function of education, experience and 
individual characteristics. Because of these factors, the quality of 
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management hypothesis applies to farm expansion buyers with high-quality 
management skills. Entering farmers would lack experience in management. 
Outside investors for the most part do not participate or do not 
completely participate in management. Thus, quality of management 
is viewed as applying exclusively to farm-expansion buyers. 
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CHAPTER IV. DATA 
The primary data used in this study were collected by students in 
Economics 440, Real Estate Appraisal, during the spring quarters of 
1978 and 1979 at Iowa State University. Each student was required to 
do a farmland appraisal based on comparable land sales. A comparable 
sale worksheet was developed for the students' use. It was this work­
sheet completed by the students which forms the primary data base. The 
following section consists of a description of the comparable sale 
worksheet and of additional secondary data. This description is then 
followed by summary statistics of the data set. 
Comparable Sale Worksheet and Secondary Data 
The comparable sale worksheet (Appendix A) is divided into five 
sections. Section I contains transfer information obtained from the 
county auditor's office. From Section I, the size of purchase and 
location of purchase are identified. Section II contains sale price 
and financing information from the county recorder's office. From 
Section II, information concerning sale price and type of financing 
(mortgage, contract, cash, etc.) and the terms of financing is obtained. 
Section III contains assessment and tax information from the county 
assessor's and treasurer's office. Assessed building values provide 
information on the value of buildings on purchased land. Section IV 
contains information on characteristics of the farm. From this section, 
information on quality and location of land and types and conditions of 
buildings is obtained. Section V, the final section, contains information 
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on characteristics of the buyer and provides the information to formulate 
variables to test the farm-expansion hypotheses. 
In addition to the data collected from the comparable sale 
worksheet, additional data were collected on crop prices, horsepower 
and labor requirements of Iowa farms, average county land values and 
inflation. Two sets of price data for com were obtained: average 
annual prices received by Iowa farmers for com as reported by the Iowa 
Crop and Livestock Reporting Service (1981, p. 88) and Thursday's mid-
range-cash price for corn for the six Iowa districts as compiled by the 
Iowa State Extension Service from USDA reports for the years 1974 to 
1979. Data on horsepower, months of labor and size of farm In acres 
for the years 1975 to 1979 were obtained from the Iowa Farm Business 
Association records compiled by the Iowa State Extension Service. 
Average county land values were obtained from Harris, Lord and Weirich 
(1980). The gross national product price deflator (GNPDFL), a measure 
of inflation, for the year 1979 was taken from the United States 
Department of Commerce Survey of Current Business (1980a, p. 16). 
For the years preceding 1979, the GNPDFL was taken from United States 
Department of Commerce Business Statistics (1980b, p. 259). 
Summary Statistics for Sales Data 
The data set consists of 186 observations. Table 4.1 lists the 
frequency of land sale observations by year of transaction. The 
observations span the years 1969 to 1979, although 90 percent of the 
observations occur after 1974. Due to the relatively few observations 
prior to 1975, only the observations from 1975 and later were used in 
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Table 4.1. Frequency of land sale observations by year of transaction 
Year of transaction Number of land sale observations 
1969 1 
1970 1 
1971 1 
1972 2 
1973 4 
1974 8 
1975 11 
1976 24 
1977 42 
1978 51 
1979 32 
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this study. Out of the remaining 160 observations, an additional 32 
observations, in which the buyer was a local or absentee investor, were 
dropped because those observations were incompatible with the model to 
be developed. 
The remaining 128 observations concerned land sales from 48 counties 
out of the 99 counties in Iowa (see Figure 4.1). The data were grouped 
by the six price-reporting districts also outlined in Figure 4.1. Table 
4.2 lists the frequency of observations by price-reporting districts. 
Forty-four percent of the observations are within the North Central 
district. 
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics for a number of variables in 
the data set. This table provides an idea of the magnitude and varia­
tion of individual variables. The price of land varies from 281 to 
3,500 dollars an acre. In terms of 1972 dollars, the range in price 
is from $184.81 to $2,150. The average size of purchase was approximately 
128 acres. There is a considerable range in corn yields for total acreage 
from 28 bushels per acre to 150 bushels per acre. The average farm size, 
including acres owned or acres rented, prior to purchase was approximately 
608 acres. The number of tractors per farm was over three, which in 
terms of total horsepower is 307 horsepower per farm. The average 
number of owner-operators per farm was 1.34. When the number of 
anticipated owner-operators planning to join the farm is added to the 
number of owner-operators, the average becomes 1.68 owner-operators per 
farm. The average years of experience and education is 18.08 and 12.66 
years, respectively. 
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Figure 4.1. Map of Iowa Indicating price-reporting districts and number of land sale 
observations by county 
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Table 4.2. Frequency of land sale observation by price-reporting 
districts in Iowa 
Price-reporting district Number of land sale observations 
Northwest 
North Central 
Northeast 
Southwest 
South Central 
Southeast 
8 
57 
20 
21 
12 
10 
Table 4.3. Summary statistics 
Number of Standard Minimum Maximum 
Variable observations Mean deviation value value 
Sale price per acre 128 1,838.77 704.70 281.00 3,500.00 
Deflated sale price per 
acre 1972 dollars 128 1,241.88 445.15 184.81 2,150.00 
Acres purchased 128 127.64 80.47 18.00 760.00 
Average yield for 
tillable acreage 107 108.79 18.43 41.00 150.00 
Average yield for 
total acreage 105 101.69 21.22 28.00 150.00 
Assessed building value 122 16,792.54 29,723.00 0.00 207,359.00 
Taxes per acre 119 11.81 3.90 2.45 25.95 
Distance to marketing center 125 4.87 3.47 0.50 21.00 
Distance to property acquired 110 3.15 3.54 0.00 25.00 
Acres owned prior to acquisition 97 433.88 785.55 0.00 7,300.00 
Acres rented prior to acquisition 96 169.64 232.34 0.00 1,380.00 
Number of tractors 85 3.25 1.55 0.00 9.00 
Total horsepower of all tractors 77 306.72 169.77 0.00 850.00 
Number of combines 82 0.99 0.77 0.00 4.00 
Number of owner-operators and 
expected owner-operators 119 1.68 0.93 1.00 7.00 
Number of owner-operators 119 1.34 0.68 1.00 4.00 
Average years of experience 
for all owner-operators 85 18.08 9.35 0.00 38.00 
Average years of education 
for all owner-operators 84 12.66 2.12 2.00 19.00 
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The micro-land-price data set summarized in Table 4.3 is a much 
richer data set than data sets previously used in studying the effect 
of farm expansion on farmland prices. Much of the variation in farmland-
sale prices throughout a county, state or the nation is eliminated by 
the use of average county, state or national data or indices of farmland 
value. This micro data set provides a number of variables on individual 
characteristics of the purchased land tract and of the buyer to help 
explain the variation of selected farmland sale prices in Iowa. 
Although this micro-land-price data set is deemed superior to the 
aggregated land value data sets, it is not without its problems. 
These problems are discussed in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
This chapter presents the empirical model used to test the effect 
of the farm-expansion factors on sale price. The empirical model was 
specified in the form of the general linear statistical model and the 
method of least squares was used to obtain parameter estimates. The 
assumptions of the general linear model and the least squares estimates 
are outlined in a number of texts (Kimenta, 1971; Maddala, 1977; 
Johnston, 1972) and are not presented here. Instead, only those 
specific problems suggested by the nature of the problem and data are 
discussed. Among those problems are whether the parameter estimates 
are homogeneous across time and different regions of Iowa, whether the 
assumption of homoscedasticity in the general linear model is violated, 
and how to treat missing observations in the data set. These problems 
and the procedure adopted to solve them are outlined in the following 
sections. 
Specification of the Empirical Model 
Valuation Equation 3.3 suggests the general form for the empirical 
model. It is assumed the value placed on an acre of land by the buyer 
is equivalent to the sale price. Thus, sale price is a linear function 
of revenues less costs. The empirical model can be expressed as: 
(5.1) PRICE = f(PQ, TAX, ESINV, DEHP, WEALTH, DEXLBR, QMEXP, 
QMED, MRKTDIST, DISTACQ, DCNTRCT, ACRES, BLDVPA) 
where PRICE is the sale price per acre deflated by the gross national 
product price deflator (GNPDFL), PQ is a three-year-moving-average-corn 
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price prior to the sale times the average-acre-corn yield based on 
total acres purchased, TAX is the per-acre property tax deflated by 
GNPDFL, ESINV is the inverse of total acres farmed including owned 
acres, rented acres and purchased acres, DEHP is a dummy variable where 
a 1 indicates excess horsepower prior to the land purchase and a 0 
indicates no excess horsepower prior to the purchase, WEALTH is the 
number of acres owned by the buyer times the average county land value 
deflated by GNPDFL, DEXLBR is a dummy variable where a 1 indicates 
excess labor prior to purchase and a 0 indicates no excess labor prior 
to purchase, QMEXP is the average years of farm experience per owner-
operator, QMED is the average years of education per owner-operator, 
MBKTDIST is the distance in miles between the purchase and the nearest 
marketing center, DISTACQ is the distance in miles between the owner's 
home base and the purchased land, DCNTRCT is dummy variable in which a 
1 indicates the purchase was financed through a land contract and a 0 
indicates the purchase was financed by other means, ACRES is the size 
of the purchased land tract, and BLDVPA is the assessed building value 
per acre deflated by GNPDFL. 
The first independent variable, PQ, is a measure of expected 
revenue. Price expectations are assumed to be a function of past 
prices, so a three-year-moving-average price was arbitrarily selected. 
Two sets of expected prices were estimated, one set using an annual-
state-average price which was assigned to all sales within a given year 
and another set using annual-average-district price assigned to all 
sales within a given year and district. The estimated parameter for 
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PQ should be positive, reflecting the increase in value due to either 
increases in expected crop prices or increases in productivity. 
Property taxes per acre is one of the cost components. The estimated 
parameter should be negative. Since the parameter estimates for PQ 
and TAX should be equivalent but of opposite sign, PQ and TAX can be 
combined into one variable, RETURN, which is PQ minus TAX. 
The next variable, ESINV, is the economies of size variable. The 
estimated parameter is hypothesized to be negative and an estimate of 
capitalized costs. As farm size in acres increases, the cost per acre 
decreases and the net return per acre increases resulting in increased 
land values. It is assumed that all acquired land increased farm size. 
An alternative specification of the economies of size variable is HPA, 
total horsepower divided by total acres or total horsepower times ESINV. 
Ayres and Boehlje (1976) have indicated that annual fixed cost of machin­
ery is a linear function of size. Thus, horsepower is used to estimate 
cost and dividing by acres gives cost per acre. This type of cost 
relationship would imply that minimum costs could be reached at various 
size farms. For example, an 80 horsepower tractor used on a 160 acre 
farm would have the same cost as a 160 horsepower tractor used on a 320 
acre farm. If the estimate for HPA is significant, this would not nec­
essarily imply that larger farms have lower average costs than small farms 
unless the data reveal a trend that larger size farms have in general a 
lower value for HPA, which happens to be the case as evidenced by a -.44 
correlation coefficient between HPA and total acres farmed. 
The estimate for the excess machinery variable, DEHP, is hypothesized 
to be a positive. To determine whether excess machinery existed, a 
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model was developed using records from the Iowa Farm Business Associa­
tion. The following equation was estimated:^ 
(5.2) HP = 75.41 + .3165 ACRES = .81. 
(16.21) (.0366) 
The variable HP was average horsepower per size class of farm. The 
variable ACRES was average total acres within each size class. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Data were collected for the years 1975 through 
1979. Equation 5.2 was used to estimate an expected horsepower require­
ment for each farm on the basis of acres owned and rented. If the actual 
total horsepower exceeded the expected horsepower, excess horsepower was 
assumed to be the case. 
The next variable, WEALTH, is expected to have a positive effect 
on sale price. This variable is a proxy for actual wealth. It is 
assumed that land is the largest component of farmer's net worth 
although a farmer's actual net worth also depends on the amount of debt 
outstanding. An alternative specification for the wealth variable is to 
replace WEALTH with the net worth dummy variables : DNWl, DNW2, DNW3 
and DNW4 representing the net worth classes of $50,001 to $100,000; 
$100,001 to $150,000; $150,001 to $200,000 and greater than $200,000, 
respectively. The estimated parameter should be positive and increase 
with wealth to indicate the increasing ability to bid in the full value 
of the nonmonetary rewards of land ownership as well as the decreasing 
likelihood of facing a credit restraint. 
^An alternative specification for expected horsepower as a function 
of acres and months of labor per acre was estimated, but the estimate for 
months of labor per acre was insignificant at a 5 percent level. Also, 
this alternative did not significantly change the final results reported 
in the results section of Chapter V. 
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The excess-labor variable, DEXLBR, is expected to be positive and 
reflect the reduction in capitalized labor costs. Excess labor was 
calculated in a similar manner as excess horsepower. The following 
equation was estimated: 
(5,3) LBR = 5.866 + .01505 ACRES R^ = .97. 
(.273) (.0006) 
The variable LBR, months of total labor, is a function of total acres. 
Equation 5.3 was used to estimate an expected labor requirement for each 
farm on the basis of acres owned and rented. If total labor which 
included the operator and anticipated owner-operators joining the farm 
business, was greater than expected labor, then excess labor was said 
to exist. All operators were assumed to supply 12 months of labor. 
An alternative to DEXLBR was DEX0PL6R, which excluded anticipated owner-
operators joining the business. 
The next two variables, QMEXP and QMED, are measures of management 
quality. Quality of management is hypothesized to be a function of 
experience and education. The estimated parameter is expected to be 
positive and an estimate of the above-average returns capitalized into 
the sale price due to quality of management. 
The remaining variables are additional variables that affect sale 
prices. The distance variables, MRKTDIST and DISTACQ, are included to 
capture transportation costs in hauling outputs or inputs. The parameter 
estimate is expected to be negative and an estimate of capitalized 
^An alternative specification for expected labor as a function of 
acres and horsepower per acre was estimated, but the estimate for horse­
power per acre was insignificant at a 5 percent level. Also, this 
alternative did not significantly change the final results reported in 
the results section of Chapter V. 
48 
transportation costs. The parameter estimate for the variable DCNTRCT 
is expected to be positive reflecting higher sale prices when financed 
by contracts. This higher value is the result of sellers negotiating 
for a higher selling price and a lower interest rate so sellers may 
report more income in terms of capital gains which are taxed at a lower 
rate than interest income. Buyers agree to such terms because the 
terms of the contract typically require lower downpayments. The 
parameter estimate for the variable ACRES is expected to be negative, 
reflecting credit limitations in bidding for larger units. The expected 
estimate for BLDVPA should be positive. If assessed building values 
are an accurate measure of value, the expected parameter value should 
be near one. 
The variables PQ, TAX, RETURN and BLDVPA are deflated by GNPDFL. 
This is consistent with valuation theory, which suggests that valuation 
can be done in either nominal or real terms. If net returns reflect 
increased returns due to inflation, then the capitalization rate should 
also be adjusted by the inflation rate, thus the effect of inflation is 
cancelled out except for the possible tax effect (Jeremias, 1981). 
If the above variables were not deflated, then the estimated parameters 
for the variables used to obtain cost estimate such as ESINV would not 
be constant since costs increase year by year due to inflation. This 
would restrict the use of the model to data from any one year. If 
parameters for the 1975 to 1979 model were estimated using nominal 
values, the estimated parameters for variables such as ESINV would be 
a weighted average cost figure weighted by an inflation index and such 
a variable would be difficult to interpret. 
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Pooling the Data 
It was desirable to pool all observations into a single data set 
to obtain more efficient estimates, since the number of observations 
for any time period and district was too small to test a model with a 
large number of variables. In order to pool the data, it was assumed 
the parameters were homogeneous over time and districts. Intercept 
parameters were allowed to vary with time and price-reporting district 
to capture the effects of missing information not included in the model, 
such as local land market conditions and changes in returns and cost 
that are not captured by the variables in the model. 
The test for the homogeneity of the slope estimates involves an F 
test as outlined by Johnston (1972, p. 199). The test is as follows: 
(5-4) f  -  '0.05' «U-
where ESS^ is the error sum of squares of the restricted model, the 
pooled model in this study, and ESS^ is the error sum of squares for 
the unrestricted model where the slope parameters are allowed to vary, 
df^ and df^ are the degrees of freedom for the restricted model and 
unrestricted model, respectively. If the calculated statistic is 
greater than the F statistic at the 5 percent error level, then the 
null hypothesis of homogeneous parameters over time and region is 
rejected and the pooled model would not be appropriate. 
Rather than estimate a model for each district for a given year, 
the assumption was made that parameters are homogeneous for all districts 
within a year. A test for equality of parameters over time is made. 
If the results of this test suggest the null hypothesis cannot be 
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rejected, then equality of parameters across years is assumed and 
equality of parameters across districts is tested. If the null hypothesis 
of equality of parameters among districts is not rejected, then the 
pooled model is used. If the null hypothesis is rejected in either 
case, then the model should be restricted to data from the year and 
district with the most observations. 
Tests for Heteroscedasticity 
One assumption of the general linear statistical model is 
homoscedasticity, which implies that the variance of the error term is 
constant for all observations. Violation of this assumption implies 
that the least squares estimates no longer have minimum variances. 
The use of a data set that has sale-price observations gathered over 
time and different districts may result in heteroscedasticity, unequal 
variances for the error term. Land prices have increased over time due 
to inflation and other economic factors. These increases in land 
prices over time may also imply increases in the variance of the error 
term over time. Across districts, variation in land prices is due to 
variation in expected yields as well as the variability of yield due to 
weather conditions. Changes in variability of yield across districts 
would likely result in increased variability in sale prices and in 
unequal variances of the error term across districts. Areas with less 
productive soil and greater chances of drought such as the southwest 
district in Iowa have lower land prices than areas with more productive 
soil and less likelihood of drought such as the north central district. 
Smaller variances of error terms would be expected with these lower 
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land prices. The problem of heteroscedasticlty is partially if not 
totally remedied by the specification of the model. Deflating land 
prices and other variables expressed in nominal terms adjusts for unequal 
variances due to inflation. Allowing intercept parameters to vary by 
year and district corrects for differences in variances peculiar to any 
year and region. 
To test whether the specified model corrects for differences among 
variances of error terms, a test for equality of variances was made. 
An estimate of the variance for each year and region was obtained from 
the test for equality of parameters. The appropriate test is; 
ESS /df. 
^ " ESS /df ^ ^.05' d^l' ^ ^s' 
s s 
where ESS^/df^ is the year or district with the expected largest mean 
square error, and ESS^/df^ is the year or district with the expected 
smallest mean square error. Among years, one would expect to find larger 
errors associated with 1979 than with 1975. Among districts, the north 
central district historically has the highest land prices, whereas the 
south central and southwest districts have the lower prices. If the 
calculated F statistic is larger than the F statistic at the 5 percent 
error level, then the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then a weighted least squares model 
is used to account for the additional information of unequal variances. 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then ordinary least squares is 
used. 
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Missing Observations 
Before any of the statistical tests covered In the previous section 
can be tested, a solution to the problem of missing observations must 
be found. A summary of different solutions is presented in Maddala 
(1977). Three solutions for missing values are the classical method, 
the first-order method and the zero-order method. The classical method 
ignores all observations with missing values, which results in a loss 
of information since other explanatory variables are dropped if only one 
variable for an observation has a missing value. In the first-order 
method, missing values are replaced by regression. The variable with 
missing values is regressed on the other independent variables. The 
estimates obtained from the first-order method are biased, but are 
often more efficient due to the gain in additional information. In the 
zero-order method, missing values are replaced by the sample mean. If 
the missing values occur only among the independent variables and are 
missing at random, then the estimates of the zero-order method are 
unbiased. As for efficiency, Haitovsky (1968) suggests that the zero-
order estimates are more efficient provided that the correlation between 
independent variables is low. 
The substitution of sample means is used to replace missing values 
in the empirical model. The zero-order method was chosen for its 
simplicity and it allows for more observations to be used. If the 
first-order method is used, a number of observations would still be 
dropped, because in many cases, one or more of the other Independent 
variables on which a variable with missing values was regressed would 
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also contain missing values. Also, the correlation matrix between 
variables (Appendix B) reveals that the correlation between independent 
variables is low, which is an indication that the zero-order estimates 
are likely to be more efficient than the classical estimates. 
Results 
The two models that are reported are: 
(5.6) PRICE = f (RETURN, ESINV, DEHP, WEALTH, DEXLBR, QMEXP, 
QMED, MRKTDIST, DISTACQ, DCNTRCT, ACRES, BLDVPA, 
DNW, DNC, DNE, DSW, DSC, D75, D76, D77, D78), 
(5.7) PRICE = f (RETURN, HPA, DEHP, WEALTH, DEXLBR, QMEXP, QMED, 
MRKTDIST, DISTACQ, DCNTRCT, ACRES, BLDVPA, DNW, 
DNC, DNE, DSW, DSC, D75, D76, D77, D78). 
The only difference between Models 5.6 and 5.7 is the specification of 
the economies of size variable. In Model 5.7, HPA replaces ESINV. 
Other models were run with alternative specifications of various 
variables such as DEXOPLBR for DEXLBR and the net worth dummy variables 
for WEALTH. The use of DEXOPLBR for DEXLBR did not Improve the results. 
The model with the net worth dummy variables was dropped due to fewer 
observations and poor survey design, which resulted in most of the 
observations being placed in the highest net worth class. Also, the 
three-year-moving-average-dlstrict-corr prices were not used because 
the data series began with the 1974 to 1975 crop year. An attempt to 
use an estimate of the three-year-average-district-corn price for the 
years 1975 and 1976 did not improve upon the results obtained by using 
the three-year-moving-average-Iowa corn price. 
Before reporting the results of Models 5.6 and 5.7, the results of 
the pooled tests and tests for heteroscedasticity are reported. 
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In Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the ESS for the unrestricted and pooled models 
for both the yearly and regional models are shown. The calculated F 
statistic for the null hypotheses of equality of slope parameters among 
years and regions is also reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The calculated 
F statistics in Table 5.1 are less than the upper 5 percent F value 
(Fq Qg gg = 1.58), which implies the null hypotheses cannot be 
rejected and pooling the data across years is appropriate. The calculated 
F statistics in Table 5.2 are also less than the upper 5 percent F value 
(Fq Qg gg = 1.57); thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and 
pooling across districts is appropriate. Using the information in 
Table 5.1, the F statistic to test the null hypothesis of equal variance 
between the years 1975-76 and 1979 are .76 and .54 for Models 5.6 and 
5.7, respectively. The F statistic is lower than the upper 5 percent 
F value (FQ o5 9 11 ~ 2.90); thus, the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Using the information in Table 5.2, the F statistics to test the null 
hypothesis of equal variances between the north central and southwest 
price-reporting districts are 1.21 and 1.15 for Models 5.6 and 5.7, 
respectively. Again, the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 5 
percent upper level (FQ QS 40 5 4.46). Thus, the least squares method 
used for estimating parameters for Models 5.6 and 5.7 is an appropriate 
method. 
The parameter estimates, their standard errors and the 95 percent 
confidence intervals for estimates for Models 5.6 and 5.7 are reported 
in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. Models 5.6 and 5.7 explained 54 and 55 percent 
of the total variation in real-per-acre prices, respectively. All the 
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Table 5.1. Error sum of squares for yearly unrestricted and pooled 
models 
Models 
ESS 
Model 5.6 
Degrees of 
freedom 
ESS 
Model 5.7 
Degrees of 
freedom 
1975-76 874,576 11 821,608 11 
1977 2,078,297 12 2,116,292 12 
1978 2,574,800 23 2,045,960 23 
1979 545.790 9 366,258 9 
Unrestricted 6,073,463 55 5,350,118 55 
Pooled 11,535,612 106 11,332,547 106 
.97 1.21 
test for equality of slope parameters. 
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Table 5.2. Error sum of squares for district unrestricted and pooled 
models 
Models 
ESS 
Model 5.6 
Degrees of 
freedom 
ESS 
Model 5.7 
Degrees of 
freedom 
NC 4,410,795 40 4,327,523 40 
NE 604,263 3 597,952 3 
SC-SE 1,139,274 4 509,930 4 
NW-SW 1.180.709* 11 1,176.846^  11 
Unrestricted 7,335,041 58 6,612,251 58 
Pooled 11,535,612 106 11,332,547 106 
.69 .86 
h^e ESS for SW only is 456,825 with 5 degrees of freedom. 
T^he ESS for SW only is 468,535 with 5 degrees of freedom, 
test for equality of slope parameters. 
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Table 5.3. Parameter estimates for Model 5.6 
Variable 
Parameter 
es timate 
Standard 
error 
Confidence 
Lower 
interval* 
Upper 
Intercept 647.77*** 372.64 -91.92 1,387.46 
RETURN 4.76*** 1.41 1.96 7.56 
ESINV -18,859.60** 11,356.18 -41,402.00 3,682.00 
DEHP 48.46 79.28 -108.91 205.83 
WEALTH .31% .32 -.32 .94 
DEXLBR 60.92 75.40 -88.75 210.59 
OMEXP -4.33 4.49 -13.25 4.57 
QMED 25.49** 18.32 -10.88 61.86 
MRKTDIST -15.29** 9.82 -34.78 4.20 
DISTACQ -7.19 9.88 -26.80 12.42 
DCNTRCT 105.23** 67.81 -29.38 239.82 
ACRES —1.04*** .41 -1.85 -.23 
BLDVPA .25 .30 -.34 .84 
DNW -16.41 171.52 -356.88 324.06 
DNC 141.98* 126.75 -109.62 393.58 
DNE -175.20* 139.62 -452.35 101.95 
DSW -335.41*** 137.53 -608.41 62.41 
DSC -119.28 152.23 -421.46 182.90 
D75 —807,49*** 182.73 -1,170.21 -444.77 
D76 —506•84*** 125.43 -755.82 -257.86 
D77 -110.97* 102.65 -314.73 92.79 
D78 -116.08** 89.50 -293.74 61.58 
R2 
.54 
®A 95 
''Per 
percent confidence 
10,000 dollars. 
interval. 
***Significant at 5 percent one tail test. 
**Significant at 10 percent one tail test. 
*Slgnificant at 15 percent one tail test. 
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Table 5.4. Parameter estimates for Model 5.7 
Variable 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
Confidence 
Lower 
interval^  
Upper 
Intercept 621.03*** 358.80 -91.18 1,333.25 
RETURN 4.87*** 1.38 2.14 7.60 
HPA -181.33*** 83.58 -347.33 -15.42 
DEHP 128.90** 86.00 -41.81 299.61 
WEALTH .38*b .31 -.25 .99 
DEXLBR 45.08 73.37 -100.56 190.72 
QMEXP -2.34 4.25 -10.78 6.10 
QMED 25.79** 18.15 -10.24 61.82 
MRKTDIST -17.21*** 9.83 -36.71 2.31 
DISTACQ -11.14* 9.79 -30.57 8.29 
DCNTRCT 92.02** 67.86 -42.68 226.72 
ACRES -1.11*** .41 -1.92 -.30 
BLDVPA .20 .30 -.39 .79 
DNW -1.18 166.22 -331.09 328.73 
DNC 182.35** 121.49 -58.81 423.51 
ONE -145.19* 133.88 -410.94 120.56 
DSW -317.30** 133.90 583.09 51.51 
DSC -107.15 150.13 -405.16 190.86 
D75 -798.58*** 181.09 -1,158.04 -439.12 
D76 -509.81*** 123.83 -755.61 264.01 
D77 -104.16 101.85 -306.33 98.01 
D78 -117.86** 88.70 -293.93 58.21 
R2 
.55 
A^ 95 
P^er 
percent confidence 
10,000 dollars. 
interval. 
***Significant at 5 percent one tail test. 
**S±gnlficant at 10 percent one tail test. 
*Significant at 15 percent one tail test. 
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parameters have the hypothesized signs with the exception of QMEXP in 
both models. The variables RETURN and ACRES are the only slope parameters 
significant at the 5 percent significance level in Model 5.6. In Model 
5.7, RETURN, HPA, MRKTDIST and ACRES are significant at the 5 percent 
significance level. 
In Tables 5.5 and 5.6, elasticities calculated at the sample means 
are presented as well as a 95 percent confidence interval for those 
elasticities at the mean. In Table 5.6, it is seen that the elasticities 
are small, ranging from 0.01 percent to 0.59 percent. A 1 percent 
increase at the mean for PRICE is approximately equivalent to a twelve 
dollar increase. Thus, a 1 percent increase in RETURN, the variable 
with the highest elasticity, would result in approximately a seven dollar 
increase in the real price of land. The second largest elasticity is for 
QMED, followed by ACRES, MRKTDIST and SIZE. All the other variables 
have elasticities of .03 percent or less. 
The fact that the elasticities are relatively small is not surprising 
with the exception of the RETURN variable. The major expected explana­
tion of land price variation is the productivity of the land and expected 
returns, whereas the farm-expansion hypotheses were expected to lead to 
marginal adjustments in sale prices. 
Before concluding the result section, a discussion of the parameter 
estimates for the farm-expansion variables is in order. The parameter 
estimates for ESINV and HPA, the economies of size variables, indicate 
that increases in farm size have an effect on land prices, but most of 
these economies have been obtained by a 700 acre farm, the approximate 
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Table 5.5. Elasticities for Model 5.6 
Variable 
Elasticity 
(percent) 
Confidence 
Lower 
interval® 
Upper 
RETURN .58 .24 .92 
SIZE^  .02 -.00 .04 
WEALTH -.01 -.01 .04 
QMEXP — .06 -.19 .07 
QMED .26 -.11 .63 
MRKTDIST -.06 -.14 .02 
DISTACQ -.02 -.07 .03 
ACRES -.11 -.19 -.02 
BLDVPA .02 -.02 .06 
95 percent confidence interval. 
^Total acres farmed. 
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Table 5.6. Elasticities for Model 5.7 
Variable 
Elasticity 
(percent) 
Confidence 
Lower 
interval^  
Upper 
RETURN .59 .26 .93 
SIZE^  .06 .00 .12 
WEALTH .02 -.01 .04 
QMEXP -.03 -.16 .09 
QMED .26 -.10 .63 
MRKTDIST -.07 -.14 .01 
DISTACQ -.03 — .08 .02 
ACRES -.11 -.20 
CO o
 1 
BLDVPA .01 -.03 .05 
95 percent confidence interval. 
^Total acres farmed. 
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sample mean for farm size. The negative 18,860 estimate for ESINV 
implies that increases from 500 to 700 acres results in an eleven 
dollar increase in sale price, whereas an additional 200 acres beyond 
700 acres results in a six dollar increase in sale price. For the model 
using HPA and assuming 300 horsepower, the change from 500 to 700 acres 
results in a thirty-one dollar increase, and a 200 acre increase beyond 
700 acres results in a seventeen dollar increase. The confidence 
interval for the elasticities ranges from 0.0 to 0.04 percent and 0.0 
to 0.12 for Models 5.6 and 5.7, respectively. The greater effect of 
size in Model 5.7 is due to the inclusion of horsepower in the economies 
of size variable, HPA, which more specifically captures the buyer's 
investment in machinery, whereas ESINV is a more general specification 
measuring economies of size in terms of acres farmed only. 
The estimates for DEHP, the excess machinery variable, would 
indicate that excess horsepower has a positive effect on sale price, 
but the confidence interval is relatively large. This large confidence 
interval is not surprising for two reasons. The degree of excess 
machinery was not actually measured, and in some cases, it could have 
been quite small relative to the size of purchase that the buyer did 
not consider he had excess machinery. Another reason is that some 
buyers consider the fact that their excess machinery has an opportunity 
value, whereas other buyers have either ignored the opportunity value 
or considered it having zero value. 
The estimates for WEALTH imply that for each $10,000 of gross 
wealth, the per-acre sale price increases by 31 cents in 
63 
Model 5.6 and by 37 cents in Model 5.7. This positive effect is as 
hypothesized but again the value is not significant. Possibly a better 
measure of wealth such as net worth would have resulted in more meaning­
ful results. 
' The estimates for DEXLBR, the excess labor variable, were positive 
as expected but not significant. This variable attempted to capture 
excess labor which may not have been the case. It was assumed each 
operator could work 12 months, where in actuality some operators may 
have alternative employment and therefore no excess labor. 
The two variables specified to capture the quality of management 
effect give conflicting results. The variable QMEXP implies years of 
experience has a negative effect on PRICE, although this is not 
significant. A possible explanation is that years of experience was cap­
turing a difference in attitude between young and older farmers instead 
of an improvement in management that comes from experience. The 
attitudes of younger farmers are often more liberal and optimistic 
than those of older farmers. The estimates for QriED suggest an 
approximate 25 to 26 dollar increase in sale price for each year of 
1 education. Thus, four years of college would imply an 8 percent 
increase in the average-per-acre-sale price. The confidence interval 
suggests the effect of a college education would approximately vary 
from a 3 percent decrease to a 21 percent increase in the average sale 
price. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, a summary of the basic objectives and results is 
presented. The summary is followed by the basic conclusions drawn from 
the results. The final section discusses some limitations of the study 
and areas for further research. 
Summary 
Five hypotheses were put forth to explain the dominance of farm-
expansion buyers in the farmland market. Those hypotheses were; 
economies of size, excess machinery, wealth, excess labor and quality 
of management. It was hypothesized that among farmland buyers, farm-
expansion buyers are most likely to consider such factors in their 
bid price for land. 
Those five hypotheses have been suggested in the literature, but 
not all of them have been theoretically evaluated or empirically tested. 
Those hypotheses that have been tested, were tested by models using 
aggregate land value data, whereas a micro-land-price-data set of Iowa 
farmland sales was used in this study. 
This data set contained information on sale price; type of 
financing; tax assessment of land and buildings; characteristics of 
the farmland such as location, productivity and types of buildings; 
and characteristics of the buyer such as years of education and farm 
experience, size of farm operation before acquisition in terms of acres 
owned and rented, number of tractors and size of tractors in terms of 
horsepower. From this data set, 128 observations were selected from 
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the years 1975 to 1979 and were grouped by the six Iowa price-reporting 
districts. 
A linear regression model was constructed and estimated by using 
ordinary least squares to explain the variation In real sale price, 
i Independent variables used to test the hypotheses were the Inverse of 
total acres farmed after the land acquisition, a dummy variable 
indicating excess machinery, acres owned times the real-average-county 
land value, a dummy variable indicating excess labor and the number of 
years of education and farm experience. Other independent variables 
were included to capture the effect of expected returns, location, land 
contracts, size of purchase and building value. The intercept was 
allowed to shift by year and price-reporting district. A second model 
replaced the inverse of total acres farmed, the economies of size 
variable, with horsepower per acre. A number of the variables had 
missing observations, which were replaced by the sample mean. 
The results Indicate that approximately 54 percent of the varia­
tion ill teal sale price was explained by the two different versions 
of the model. All of the estimates had the hypothesized sign with the 
i exception of years of experience. Of the variables used to capture 
the effect of the farm-expansion hypotheses, only the estimate for 
the horsepower per acre specification of the economies of size 
hypothesis was significant at the 5 percent level. Estimates for other 
variables that were significant were expected returns, size of purchase 
and distance to marketing center. 
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Conclusions 
The basic advantage that farm-expansion buyers or farm-expansion 
buyers with medium or large size farms have over entering farmers or 
farmers with smaller farms is the ability to achieve size economies. 
In our sample of farm sales, 90 percent of the farm tracts sold were 
less than 200 acres. This lack of large farm tracts for sale implies 
entering farmers or farmers with small farms are less likely to find 
land tracts large enough to allow them to achieve size economies. Unless 
entering farmers can alternatively lease additional land to obtain size 
economies, they cannot compete with medium or large farms in bidding 
for small tracts of land. The absence of larger land tracts for sale 
might imply a limitation of credit for entering farmers, which bars 
them from entering the land market. Possible evidence for the limita­
tion of credit is the inverse relationship between sale price and size 
of purchase. 
The fact that the variables for excess machinery and excess labor 
hypotheses are not significant leads to the conclusion that either the 
specification of those variables or the data sample did not capture the 
hypothesized effect. Or, the fact that the variables had the hypothesized 
sign suggests that in some cases, farmers have not valued their labor and 
machinery in bidding for land, but overall there is no evidence to 
suggest that farm-expansion buyers ignore or incorrectly compute the 
opportunity cost of their excess labor and excess machinery. 
As for the effect of wealth, either (1) the specified variable did 
not capture actual wealth, which is quite likely since the specified 
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variable was a measure of total land assets rather than net worth, 
(2) the wealthier farm-expansion buyers do not bid in nonmonetary 
returns to land, or (3) the bidding of nonmonetary returns into land 
is not related to wealth. As for the relationship between wealth and 
credit availability, it appears the less wealthy were not restricted 
in bidding for land. Since the sample contains only successful bidders, 
it may be that all the buyers in the sample had enough relative wealth 
or credit availability in relation to the size of their land purchase. 
As for quality of management, there is some evidence to suggest 
that farm-expansion buyers with more years of education are able to 
bid more for land. As for experience, the results suggest that 
experience has a possible negative effect if any effect at all on sale 
price. A possible explanation for the negative effect was suggested 
in Chapter V. The explanation was that experience was measuring a 
difference in attitude, where older farmers are more conservative and 
less optimistic than younger farmers. 
In the introduction, the question was raised whether farm-expansion 
buyers are efficiently allocating resources. If the estimates for the 
excess machinery and excess labor variables had been significant, this 
would have suggested that farm-expansion buyers were over-valuing land 
at the expense of under-valuing the opportunity cost for machinery and 
labor. Since the estimates for the excess machinery and excess labor 
variables are not significant, this would suggest that over all, farm-
expansion buyers have not over-valued land. The results of the model 
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suggest the economic factors of expected return, economies of size, 
distance from marketing center and size of purchase are the major 
determinants of land prices. 
Another concern raised in the introduction was whether farm-
1 expansion buyers have driven the price of land up to a point where it 
has become a potential barrier to entry and the implications this has 
for the ownership structure of farmland. Again, the results provide 
no conclusive evidence that farm-expansion buyers are over-valuing land. 
It would appear that the motive for farm-expansion buyers is to obtain 
control over additional land resources in order to attain economies of 
size. If policy makers, who are concerned about the concentration of 
land ownership, took action to restrict the acquisition of land by farm-
expansion buyers, they may be doing so at the cost of efficiency. On 
the other hand, the results indicate that a major portion of the size 
economies have been obtained by the average farm size in the sample 
(700 acres). Thus, a policy restricting land acquisition beyond a 
farm size of 700 acres or more would not have much effect on efficiency. 
This study suggests that the possible barriers to entry are the present 
fragmented ownership pattern, which makes farm tracts of adequate size 
unavailable for sale or possibly for rent also. A second barrier is 
credit limitations suggested by the inverse relationship of sale price 
and size of purchase. Thus, policy makers concerned about entry into 
farming should focus their attention on supply of land for sale or 
rent and credit availability. 
Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
A major limitation of much research is the lack of adequate data. 
Although the data set used in this study is more suited to the objectives 
of the study than the use of aggregate land value data, the data set is 
not without its problems. The method of using students to collect the 
data was inexpensive. The use of qualified surveyers to obtain the same 
information would have been an expensive process. Although the method 
of data collection was Inexpensive, it was not without its cost in terms 
of quality. It was assumed the students did an accurate job of collec­
tion, but this does not rule out the possibility of inconsistencies In 
collection and manufactured data, which would have resulted In biased 
estimates. The major problem with the data was the number of Incomplete 
observations. 
In addition to the problems of data collection, there is the 
problem of poor design of the questionnaire and problems of interpreta­
tion. From the questionnaire, it was not clear whether the purchased 
land was previously rented or was a completely new addition. And as 
mentioned in Chapter V, the design of the net worth categories did not 
cover a large enough range. 
There is always the limitation that the data set does not provide 
enough information. It was assumed in the present study that the 
capitalization rate among buyers was the same. In actuality, the 
capitalization rate is a function of a number of factors that vary 
among individuals. These factors are the expected Interest rate on 
long-term debt, the rate of return on equity, the desired debt-equity 
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position, the marginal tax bracket, the expected real growth rate, the 
expected inflation rate and an individual's aversion to risk. In 
designing future land value surveys, it would be valuable to collect 
information or devise ways of estimating those factors. 
i The present data set does not reveal much about the actual local 
market conditions in which the sale took place. The final sale price 
is often the result of a bargaining process between seller and buyer. 
There is no information about the condition of the sale such as whether 
the seller was retiring, whether the seller was a small operator or 
whether the sale was to settle an estate or the result of a foreclosure. 
Also, there is no information as to the number of buyers. Questions 
concerning the number of potential buyers farming land adjacent to the 
land for sale were not asked. An actual interview with the seller, 
buyer and other potential buyers asking them what factors they considered 
in developing their bid and asking prices may provide additional insight 
in explaining the variation in sale prices and in determining whether 
resources are allocated efficiently. 
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APPENDIX A. COMPARABLE SALE WORKSHEET 
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COMPARABLE SALE WORKSHEET 
Comparable Sale # Student Name 
I. TRANSFER INFORMATION (AUDITOR'S OFFICE) 
A. Seller (Grantor); B. Buyer (Grantee): 
C. Date of Instrument: D. Number of Acres: 
E. County: Township: Nearest Town: 
F. Legal Description: 
II. SALE PRICE INFORMATION (RECORDER'S OFFICE) 
A. Deed Book (Verify Legal Description) 
1. Consideration Shown: $ 2. Date of Deed: 
3. Stamp Tax: $ 4. Other (e.g. assumed mortgage): 
B. Mortgage and Contract Book 
1. Type of Financing (Check One) : Mortgage ; Contract ; 
2. Date of Mortgage or Contract: 
3. Downpayment: $ 
4. Amount of Mortgage or Contract: $ 
5. Interest Rate: % 
6. Term: years 
7. Payment Pattern 
a. Periodic Payments: $ 
b. Balloon Payment: $ 
C. Sale Price Verification 
1. Verification by; ; Date: ; Place: 
2. Consideration Paid: $ 
3. Per Acre Value: $ 
III. ASSESSMENT AND TAX INFORMATION (ASSESSOR'S AND TREASURER'S OFFICE) 
A. Date of Assessment: 
B. Assessed Value 
1. Land; $ 2. Buildings 3. Total $ 
C. Tax Levy: $ /thousand 
D. Total Taxes: $ E. Taxes Per Acre: $ 
Comparable Sale #_ 
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Student Name 
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF FARM (ASSESSOR'S OFFICE AND OTHER) 
A. Location: 
1. Distance to Nearest Farm Supply and Marketing Center; miles 
2. Road Surface (Check One): County Gravel ; County Blacktop 
State Highway ; Federal Highway 
B. Productivity (Under Highest and Best Use): 
1. Number of Tillable Acres: 
2. Number of Acres in Permanent Pasture: 
3. Number of Acres in Waste and Farmstead: 
4. Total Farm Average CSR: 
5. Tillable Acres Average CSR: 
6. Total Farm Average Corn Yield; 
7. Tillable Acres Average Corn Yield: 
C. Buildings and Improvements; 
1. Buildings Condition (Check One): Obsolete ; Poor 
Average ; Above Average ; Excellent 
2. Specialized Facilities (Check Where Appropriate): 
Confinement Hog Operation Confinement Cattle Operation 
Harvester Sllo(s) Other (Describe) 
3. Terraces (Check One); None ; Some ; Extensive 
4. Tiling (Check One) ; None ; Some ; Extensive 
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF BUYER 
A. Form of Ownership (Check One) : Owner-Operator ; 
Local Landlord ; Absentee Landlord 
B. Type of Organization (Check One): 
1. Single Proprietor 
2. Partnership ; Number of Owner-Operators 
3. Family Corporation ; Number of Owner-Operators 
4. Other Corporation 
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Comparable Sale # Student Name 
C. Size of Operation Before Acquisition (If Owner-Operator): 
1. Number of Acres Owned: 2. Number of Acres Rented-In: 
3. Number of Tractors (over 20hp) Owned: 
a. Horsepower: ; ; ; ; 
b. Age: ; ; ; ; 
4. Number of Self-Propelled Combines: 
a. Number of Rows on Corn Head: ; ; 
b. Age: ; ; 
D. Location of Buyer (If Owner-Operator): 
1. Distance from Farm Base to New Acquisition: miles 
E. Personal Characteristics of Buyer at Time of Acquisition (If Owner-Operated): 
1. Number Years Farming of Owner-Operator(s): 
2. Highest Year of School Completed of Owner-Operator(s); 
3. Number of Anticipated Owner-Operators to Join Farming Unit During 
Next Five Years: 
4. Amount of Off-Farm Income of Owner-Operator(s) and Family(ies)(Check One): 
None ; $l-$5,000 ; $5,001-$10,000 ; $10,001-$15,000 ; 
$15,000 and above 
5. Amount of Net Worth of Owner-Operator(s) and Family(ies) (Check One): 
$0-$50,000 ; $50,001-$100,000 ; $100,00i-$150,000 ; 
$150,001-$200,000 ; $200,001 and above 
VI. COMMENTS: 
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APPENDIX B. CORRELATION MATRIX 
I 
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Table B.l. Correlation matrix 
Variables PRICE RETURN ESINV HPA DEHP WEALTH DEXLBR 
PRICE 1.00 0.25 -0.16 -0.08 0.11 0.20 -0.10 
RETURN 1.00 -0.30 0.07 0.39 0.02 -0.04 
ESINV 1.00 0.40 -0.06 -0.21 0.25 
HPA 1.00 0.47 -0.34 0.15 
DEHP 1.00 -0.24 0.04 
WEALTH 1.00 -0.30 
DEXLBR 1.00 
QMEXP 
QMED 
MRKTDIST 
DISTACQ 
DCNTRCT 
ACRES 
BLDVPA 
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Table B.l. Continued 
Variables QMEXP QMED MRKTDIST DISTACQ DCNTRCT ACRES BLDVPA 
PRICE -0.06 0.16 -0.23 -0.00 0.09 -0.18 -0.02 
RETURN 0.04 0.29 -0.27 -0.13 -0.02 0.18 -0.12 
ESINV -0.36 -0.00 -0.03 0.06 -0.06 -0.27 0.07 
HPA -0.08 0.03 -0.24 -0.14 -0.21 -0.30 -0.09 
DEHP -0.13 0.11 -0.19 -0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.03 
WEALTH 0.31 0.03 -0.15 0.25 -0.11 0.07 -0.06 
DEXLBR -0.13 -0.18 0.07 -0.04 0.14 -0.01 0.05 
QMEXP 1.00 -0.13 0.03 0.00 -0.19 -0.05 -0.14 
QMED 1.00 -0.02 0.16 -0.09 0.14 -0.00 
MRKTDIST 1.00 0.04 -0.16 0.01 0.02 
DISTACQ 1.00 -0.09 0.15 -0.10 
DCNTRCT 1.00 -0.03 0.08 
ACRES 1.00 0.15 
BLDVPA 1.00 
